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 1 Introduction
Analyzing the social impact of tax reforms can be done in two ways. The
ﬁrst speciﬁes a particular form for the social evaluation function (SEF) and
then searches for an optimal tax structure. The nature of that optimal tax
structure is then conditional on the choice of the speciﬁc SEF. The second
route assumes that we do not know precisely what the SEF is (or should
be). The search is then for tax reforms that can improve on the existing tax
system for a whole class of SEF – viz, it is a search for “socially-eﬃcient”
reforms.
Searches for socially-eﬃcient marginal tax reforms have been recently
carried out using marginal stochastic dominance tests. Two tests have been
proposed. The ﬁrst test was introduced by Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and
compares the concentration curves of two commodities. The second test was
proposed by Makdissi and Wodon (2002) and Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon
(2002) and compares “consumption dominance” curves. The ﬁrst of these
two tests covers the class of all SEF that are averse to inequality – namely, it
tests for marginal second-order dominance. The second test can be designed
to cover the social impact of tax reforms at any order of dominance.
This note extends the poverty results of Makdissi and Wodon (2002) to
allow agents to diﬀer in dimensions that cannot always be precisely captured
within the usual money-metric indicators of living standards. Examples of
such dimensions include temporal or spatial variation in price indices, varying
individual needs, or heterogenous social or political “merits”. All such dimen-
sions have the common property of often being diﬃcult to measure precisely.
For expositional simplicity, we follow in this paper much of the previous lit-
erature on multidimensional dominance and focus on the diﬃculty involved
in equivalizing living standards in the presence of heterogenous household
size and composition (on this, see inter alia Buhman et al. (1987), Atkinson
and Bourguignon (1982, 1987), Atkinson (1991), and Jenkins and Lambert
(1993)).
In the spirit of Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996), we thus derive sequential
stochastic dominance conditions that can be used to check whether an indi-
rect tax reform is eﬃcient over classes of SEF and over general assumptions on
the shape of equivalence scales. Unlike Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996), who
consider second-order dual social-welfare tests, we consider poverty domi-
nance of arbitrary ethical order using primal tests. Robustness is then also
obtained over ranges of poverty lines for each household type.
22 Measuring poverty
Individuals are members of households that are heterogenous in size k . There
are n diﬀerent household sizes. For expositional simplicity, we assume that
individuals are otherwise homogenous. We denote by fk (y) the density func-
tion of per capita income among individuals who are members of group k, and
assume it to be nil outside of the interval [0;a] – where a is greater than the
maximum per capita income of all household types and is also greater than
the maximum conceivable individual poverty line. Hence,
R a
0 fk (y)dy = 1
for all k. Denote by µk the population share of individuals who are members
of households of size k. We suppose that the government wishes to reduce

















is the ﬁnite contribution to aggregate poverty of an individual
who is member of group k and whose real per capita income is given by yE.
For anyone in poverty, pk
¡
yE¢
¸ 0, but pk
¡
yE¢
= 0 whenever yE exceeds the
poverty line of group k, given by zk. We further denote by z
+
k the maximum
conceivable poverty line that we may wish to consider for each group k. It
must therefore be that zk · z
+
k for all k.
Let q be the vector of consumption prices; it equals production prices
e (normalized to one and assumed constant) plus indirect taxes t, that is,
q = e + t. Denote as qR the consumption price vector for a reference period.
Real income, yE, is the level of income that would have yielded under qR the
same level of utility as income y under q. Letting v (¢) be the indirect utility







= v (q;y;k): (1)
In order to develop sequential stochastic dominance conditions of order s,
we further require that the poverty measure pk (¢) be a continuous function



























k (¢) is the l-th derivative of pk (¢). The class of all poverty measures
that obey assumptions A1, A2 and A3 is denoted by Πs.1 Note that this
formulation is very general with respect to the choice of poverty lines zk. All
that is required is that zk · z
+
k and that the choices of the implicit zk in the
pk (¢) do not contradict assumptions A1, A2 and A3.
Note that the un-normalized version2 of the popular Foster, Greer and













We can check that p
(s)









¯ increases when zk increases. Other well-known additive
indices also satisfy assumption A3 weakly for s = 1, such as the Watts (1968)
index – for which pk(x) = ln(zk)¡ln(x) – and the indices of Clark, Hemming
and Ulph (1981)3 where pk(x) = 1
c[(zk)c¡xc], c · 1. For these latter indices,
the ﬁrst derivatives at a given level of income are equal for all types of
households. Furthermore, the signs of the derivatives are as assumed in A3.
These indices thus satisfy weakly assumption A3.
The normative interpretation of the various orders of unidimensional
poverty dominance is discussed in some detail in Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon
(2002). It is also illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, both showing 3 panels of
poverty-decreasing transfers each of 1 unit of income, either simultaneously
in two groups k and k + 1 (Figure 1) or within a single group k (Figure 2).
Note that assumption A3 for s = 1 implies that an increase in per capita
real income weakly reduces poverty, whatever the value of k. Living in small
households presumably reduces, however, the opportunities for sharing re-
sources and thus for beneﬁtting from economies of scales in the production
of welfare. At a given value of per capita income yE, individuals living in
1The continuity assumption A2 together with the assumption that pk
¡
yE¢
= 0 for the
non-poor excludes s-related levels of discontinuities at the poverty line, a point which is
clearly discussed in Zheng (1999).
2The original formulation proposed by Foster et al. (1984) involves a normalization by
zk – assumption A3 would not be satisﬁed for these normalized indices.
3Again, the original formulation proposed by Clark et al. (1981) involves a normaliza-
tion by zk, which means that assumption A3 would not be satisﬁed for these indices.
4small households can then be considered to have a lower overall level of wel-
fare than those living in larger ones. As depicted by the ﬁrst panel of Figure
1, for s = 1 and at a given real income yE, the potential for signiﬁcant
poverty reduction is then assumed by A3 to be greater for individuals living
in smaller households. This is also a relatively straightforward application of
Sen’s (1997) Weak Equity Axiom – as pointed out in Duclos and Makdissi
(2001).
For s = 2, assumption A3 says that the potential for poverty reduction
decreases as we move toward the poverty line. This implies that an equalizing
transfer from a richer to a poorer individual of the same group will weakly
decrease poverty, as depicted by the ﬁrst panel of Figure 2. As displayed
in the second panel of Figure 1, Assumption A3 also implies that (ceteris
paribus) this decreasing eﬀect is stronger for equalizing transfers across in-
dividuals who are members of smaller households. This constitutes a “weak
version” of a “favorable composite transfer” (see Kolm (1976) and Kakwani
(1980)). Poverty indices that are members of Π3 are sensitive to “favorable
composite transfers” across individuals of the same group (see the second
panel of Figure 2), and the more so, the smaller the size of the households to
which the individuals concerned by these transfers belong (see the third panel
of Figure 1). The normative content of higher orders of Πs (such as Π4 in the
third panel of Figure 2) can be interpreted using the generalized transfers
of Fishburn and Willig (1984) together with a “weak version” (analogous to
Sen’s Weak Equity Axiom) of a higher-order (s + 1) normative principle.
It can be shown that moving to higher-order classes of poverty indices
increases the analyst’s ability to identify poverty-reducing tax reforms, al-
though as the above discussion will have shown, it also restricts the size of
these classes. As noted above, we may also wish to use this framework to
identify reforms that decrease poverty for a population of individuals that
diﬀer, for instance, in diﬃcult-to-measure prices, needs or merits. In such
cases, one would rank groups of individuals in decreasing values of price in-
dices, merits or needs, denoting by k = 1 the group facing the largest (but
not precisely measurable) price level, or the group suﬀering from the highest
needs, or the group exhibiting the greatest political or social merits4. The
force of the normative principles illustrated by the panels of Figure 2 would
4An example of the latter practice might stem from some discriminatory political be-
havior – one that favors more a decrease in poverty for some ethnic or regional group than
for others.
5then be assumed to be greatest among those with the lowest value of k.
3 Poverty-reducing ﬁscal reforms
We wish to ﬁnd a commodity j whose tax rate can be increased for the
beneﬁt of a revenue-neutral fall in the tax rate of a commodity i. This ﬁscal
reform should reduce poverty. Let xik (q;y) be the consumption of the ith
commodity by an individual with per capita income y in a household of size








xik (q;y)dFk (y): (3)





where I is the number of commodities in the economy. Revenue neutrality



















dqj = 0: (5)






















Following Wildasin (1984), we may interpret the parameter ® as the diﬀer-
ential economic eﬃciency cost of raising one dollar of public funds by taxing
the jth versus the ith commodity.






























Setting qR to q, the change in real income induced by a marginal change











= ¡xik (q;y): (9)





















We can now introduce Consumption Dominance (CD) curves, CDs
ik (y).







which gives the density of the consumption of good i by individuals of type













ik (u)du; s = 2;3;::: (12)









fk (u)du; s = 2;3;::: (13)
Note that µkCD2
ik (y) gives the share of the total consumption of commodity
i found among individuals whose income is less than y and who are members





































(15) suggests that the diﬀerence between two CD curves can be important
in determining whether a tax reform involving the two goods can be deemed
good for poverty alleviation for a particular P. This result is in fact consid-
erably more general, as the following theorem formalizes (its proof is shown
in the appendix).






will reduce poverty for all P 2 Πs, for any given s = 1;2;3;:::, and for all
zk · z
+











¸ 0; 8y · z
+
l ; 8l 2 f1;2;:::;ng: (16)
Note that, for a given s, Theorem 1 allows for considerable freedom in the
choice of particular poverty indices to use for each subgroup k, in the selection
of poverty lines to apply to each of these subgroups, in the precise ways in
which household size enters into the pk (¢) functions, and in the manner in
which per capita income and household size combine to generate individual
welfare. Yet, if condition (16) holds, we are assured that the tax reform will
be beneﬁcial whatever these precise choices may be, so long as they conform
to the general assumptions that deﬁne Πs.
An important implication of Theorem 1 is that evaluating the poverty
impact of a marginal indirect tax reform involving two goods can be done
quite straightforwardly even in a world of diﬃcult-to-measure individual het-
erogeneity. All that is needed is disaggregated pre-reform consumption data
on the two goods, the ratio of the marginal economic eﬃciency cost of the two
goods, and a ranking of the individuals in terms of “needs”. In particular,
there is no need for estimates of the parameters of individual demand func-
tions or estimates of equivalence scales. One can also use the methodology
proposed by Duclos and Makdissi (2001) to identify the social preferences
underlying an observed tax reform. This method, which is analogous to the
“inverse optimum problem” of Ahmad and Stern (1984, 1991), consists in
estimating the preferences of a social planner that would support a given
economic policy.
84 Conclusion
We have shown in this note how CD curves can be used to test for sequential
stochastic dominance in an environment in which there are heterogenous
households as well as uncertainty on the exact equivalence scale to be used
to compare the welfare of the individuals living in these households. More
generally, the tools can be extended to deal with comparisons of social welfare
(where we let the maximum poverty lines extend to inﬁnity), and to cases in
which there are uncertain cardinal diﬀerences in prices, needs or merits (by
ordering individuals in decreasing order of price indices, needs or merits).
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10A Proof of Theorem 1


















































We know that CD2







= 0. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of the equa-







































































































We know that CDs







= 0. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (20)





























11Equations (18) and (21) obey the relation assumed in equation (19). We
have shown that if (19) is true then (21) is true. This implies that equation
































ik (y) ¡ ®CDs
jk (y)
¤
¸ 0 8y · z
+
l and 8l 2 f1;2;:::;ng, then
dP · 0.
5 Abel’s lemma is proved in Jenkins and Lambert (1993):
Abel’s Lemma: If xn ¸ xn¡1 ¸ ::: ¸ x2 ¸ x1 ¸ 0, a suﬃcient condition for Pn
i=1 xiyi ¸ 0 is
Pn
i=j yi ¸ 0 for each j. If xn · xn¡1 · ::: · x2 · x1 · 0, the
same condition is suﬃcient for
Pn
i=1 xiyi · 0.
12